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- John Hickey Welcome
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- Introduction
- Lesson 1 - Systems Approach to Safety
- Lesson 2 - Lessons Learned from Accidents
- United Flight 227, B-727, Salt Lake City
- accident summary - page 1
- accident summary - page 2
- accident board findings
- accident board recommendations - page 1
- accident board recommendations - page 2
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions - page 2
- safety assumptions - question
- design and safety assumptions - page 2
- precursors
- resulting acs - page 1
- resulting acs - page 2
- airworthiness directives - page 1
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned - page 2
- final thoughts
- certification basis - unsafe
- certification basis - design
- flash - guillotine test
- National Airlines Flight 27, DC-10, Albuquerque
- summary
- summary - page 2
- figure 3 - cf6-6 wing installation
- figure 4 - cf6-6 engine cutaway
- summary - page 3
- summary - page 4
- summary - page 5
- cabin window
- summary - page 6
- summary - page 7
- summary - page 8
- findings
- ntsb findings
- recommendations
- recommendations - page 2
- recommendations - page 3
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions
- certification basis - existing regulations
- design and safety assumptions - question
- design and safety assumptions
- precursors
- percursors - continued
- resulting acs, guidance and policy
- airworthiness directives
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned
- lessons learned - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- conclusion
- bellmouth definition
- campbell diagram
- red herring definition
- vibratory mode definition
- flash animation of six wave mode
- flash animation of fan blade rocking motion
- certification basis - design assumptions
- Turk Hava, DC-10, Paris
- accident summary - page 1
- accident summary - page 2
- accident summary - page 3
- accident summary - page 3a
- accident summary - page 4
- accident summary - page 4a
- accident board findings - page 1
- accident board findings - page 1aa
- accident board findings - page 1a
- accident board findings - page 1b
- accident board recommendations
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions - page 2
- safety assumptions - question
- design and safety assumptions - page 2
- design and safety assumptions - page 3
- precursors
- precursors - Page 2
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 1
- airworthiness directives
- lessons not learned - page 1
- lessons not learned - page 2
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned - page 2
- final thoughts
- certification basis
- figure 1
- figure 2
- figure 3
- figure 4
- figure 5
- figure 6
- figure 7
- figure 8
- figure 9
- figure 10
- figure 8 - 2nd version
- animation 2 - latching process
- tad - page 1
- tad - page 2
- tad - page 3
- tad - page 4
- wmv - cargo door
- certification basis - design assumptions
- tad - page 1 - Lessons not learned
- tad - page 2 - lessons not learned
- tad - page 3 - lessons not learned
- tad - page 4 - lessons not learned
- windsor accident summary
- windsor accident Summary - page 2
- windsor accident summary - page 3
- windsor accident summary - page 4
- windsor accident summary - page 5
- Japan Airlines Flight 123, B-747, Tokyo
- summary
- summary page 2
- flight path
- summary page 3
- findings
- aft pressure bulkhead
- 747 rear fuselage
- findings page 2
- findings page 3
- correct v. incorrect repair
- pressure bulkhead repair
- findings page 4
- recommendations
- recommendations page 2
- recommendations page 3
- recommendations page 4
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions page 2
- design and safety assumptions - question
- design and safety assumptions
- design and safety assumptions - continued
- precursors
- resulting acs
- airworthiness directives
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned - continued
- conclusion
- flash splice plate
- flash skin flapping
- American Flight 191, DC-10, Chicago
- summary page 1
- figure 2 - lift curve
- flash - angle of attack
- flash - loss of lift
- summary page 2
- summary - page 2a
- flash - forklift vibration
- flash - side view
- figure 4 - pylon access doors
- figure 5 - wing/pylon attach points
- figure 6 - detailed cutaway
- figure 7 - DC-10 wing/pylon structure
- summary page 4
- aviation week articles
- summary page 5
- findings
- findings - page 2
- findings - page 3
- summary page 6
- recommendations
- recommendations - page 2
- recommendations - page 3
- unsafe conditions - question (sum7)
- unsafe conditions
- precursors
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned
- crash to boost FAA scrutiny
- crash to boost FAA scrutiny - page 2
- crash to boost FAA scrutiny - page 3
- crash to boost FAA scrutiny - page 4
- type certificate lifted
- type certificate lifted - page 2
- type certificate lifted - page 3
- type certificate lifted - page 4
- pylon-related bulletins
- pylon-related bulletins - page 2
- faa probe
- faa probe - page 2
- certification basis - existing regulations
- resulting acs
- airworthiness directives
- conclusion
- emergency order
- emergency order - page 2
- certification basis - continued
- certification basis - continued
- certification basis - continued
- Aloha Airlines Flight 243, B-737, Maui
- summary page 1
- summary page 2
- summary page 3
- summary page 4
- summary page 5
- figure 5 - lap joint detail
- figure 6 - lap splice before and after repair
- findings
- recommendations
- recommendations - continued
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions
- safety/design assumptions - question
- safety/design assumptions
- precursors
- resulting acs, guidance and policy
- airworthiness directives
- lessons learned question
- lessons learned
- lessons learned - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- conclusion
- certification basis - existing regulations
- lap joint schematic
- cross section of rivet and skin showing crack
- propagation of cracks
- ntsb findings page 1
- ntsb findings page 2
- ntsb findings page 3
- typical lap joint showing adhesive
- flash animation of lap joint disbonding
- ntsb recommendations page 1
- ntsb recommendations page 2
- ntsb recommendations page 3
- boeing lap joint inspection schematic
- cold bond process
- detail of lap splice before and after
- close up of detail of lap joint section
- close call
- close call - continued
- close call - two cracks
- video of aloha airlines
- United Flight 232, DC-10, Sioux City
- accident summary - page 1
- accident summary - page 2
- accident summary - page 3
- accident summary - page 3a
- accident summary - page 4
- accident summary - page 4.5
- accident summary - page 5
- accident summary - page 6
- accident summary - page 7
- accident board findings
- accident board recommendations - page 1
- accident board recommendations - page 2
- accident board recommendations - page 3
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions - page 2
- design and safety assumptions - question
- design and safety assumptions - page 2
- precursors - page 1
- precursors - page 2
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 1
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 2
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 3
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 4
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 5
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 6
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 7
- resulting acs, regulatory guidance and policy - page 8
- airworthiness directives issued - page 1
- airworthiness directives issued - page 2
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned - page 2
- lessons learned - page 3
- fnal thoughts
- certification basis - existing regulations
- figure 1
- figure 2
- figure 3
- figure 4
- figure 5
- figure 6
- figure 7
- figure 8
- figure 9
- figure 10
- figure 11
- figure 12
- figure 13
- sioiux city - video
- figure 12 - second use for acs
- var process
- certification basis - design assumptions
- upper left - dc-10 hydraulic diagram
- upper right - dc-10 hydraulic diagram
- bottom left - dc-10 hydraulic diagram
- bottom right - dc-10 hydraulic diagram
- TWA Flight 800, B-747, Atlantic Ocean
- summary - page 1
- summary - page 2
- movie - final flight path
- summary - page 3
- findings
- accident board findings - page 2
- center wing tank
- recommendations
- unsafe conditions - question
- certification basis
- unsafe conditions
- precursors
- resulting acs, guidance and policy
- airworthiness directives
- lessons learned
- defenses in depth
- defenses in depth - continued
- defenses in depth - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- lessons learned - continued
- lesson learned 1 - details
- lessons learned 1a - details
- lessons learned 1b - details
- lessons learned 1c - details
- lessons learned 2 - details
- flash - swiss cheese model
- lessons learned 3 - details
- design philosophy
- design philosophy - page 2
- design philosophy - page 3
- design philosophy - page 4
- design philosophy - page 5
- design philosophy - page 6
- design philosophy - page 7
- design philosophy - page 8
- design philosophy - page 9
- flash - animation of explosion
- flash - flammability envelope - unsafe conditions
- flash - center and wing tank
- lessons learned - continued
- design details - page 1
- design details - page 2
- design details - page 3
- design details - page 4
- design details - page 5
- design details - page 6
- design details - page 7
- design details - page 8
- design details - page 9
- fuel tank safety
- brochure
- key points
- final thoughts
- flash - flammability envelope - details
- Swissair Flight 111, MD-11, Peggy's Cove
- accident summary - page 1
- accident summary - page 2
- accident summary - page 3
- accident summary - page 4
- accident summary - page 4a
- accident summary - page 4b
- accident summary - page 5
- accident summary - page 6
- accident summary - page 6a
- accident summary - page 7
- accident summary - page 7a
- accident summary - page 8
- accident summary - page 8a
- accident board findings - page 1
- accident board findings - page 2
- accident board findings - page 2a
- accident board findings - page 3
- accident board findings - page 4
- accident board recommendations - page 1
- accident board recommendations - page 1a
- accident board recommendations - page 2
- accident board recommendations - page 3
- accident board recommendations - page 4
- accident board recommendations - page 5
- accident board recommendations - page 6
- unsafe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions - page 2
- design and safety assumptions - question
- design and safety assumptions - page 2
- precursors
- resulting acs - page 1
- airworthiness directives - page 1
- airworthiness directives - page 2
- lessons learned - question
- lessons learned - page 2
- final thoughts
- certification basis
- figure 1 - flight plan
- video 1
- video 2
- mpet insulation blanket
- diagram of cockpit area and ifen wire bundle
- diagram of heat damage
- SBA Report
- burn test specimen
- vertical burn test setup
- vertical burn test chamber
- certification basis - design assumptions
- Alaska Airlines Flight 261, MD-83, Point Mugu
- summary - page 1
- summary - page 2
- summary - page 3
- summary - page 3a
- summary - page 4
- longitudinal trim system
- horizontal stabilizer movie
- summary - page 6
- summary - page 7
- findings
- findings - page 2
- findings - page 4
- findings - page 5
- findings - page 6
- recommendations
- recommendations - page 2
- unssfe conditions - question
- unsafe conditions
- safety assumptions - question
- safety assumptions
- precursors
- precursor 1 pop-up
- precursor 2 pop-up
- airworthiness directives
- lessons learned
- lessons learned - page 2
- conclusion
- vertical stabilizer
- radar altitude data
- acme screw close up
- acme screw close-up - 2
- acme nut assembly
- interior of acme nut
- ntsb report table 2
- jack screw assembly
- certification basis
- flash animation of thread wear
- conclusion for lesson 2
- acme nut
- sdr report
- faa letter
- mcdonnell-douglas letter
- United Flight 227, B-727, Salt Lake City
- Lesson 3 - Case Studies
- Design Approval Case Studies
- Continued Operational Safety (COS) Case Studies
- Summary
- Reference Library
- accident summaries
- videos
- animations
- root cause analyses
- flash chicago dc-10 side view
- flash chicago dc-10 loss of lift
- flash chicago dc-10 forklift
- flash chicago dc-10 angle of attack
- flash alaska jackscrew wear
- flash albuquerque fan blade rocking
- flash albuquerque six wave mode
- flash japan correct/incorrect splice plate
- flash japan correct/incorrect bulkhead repair
- flash paris dc-10 cargo door latch
- flash twa 800 fuel tanks
- flash aloha
- flash salt lake city - fuel lines stretch
- flash swiss cheese model
- flash twa 800 defenses in depth
- wmv - paris door loss/floor collapse
- flash twa 800 latent faults
- aloha video 1
- flash twa flammability envelope
- wmv - paris cargo door latch
- useful web-sites
- suggested reading
